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F REE speech is sacred to any democratic society. However, the
sometimes painful bite of unfettered speech leads many to ask
two perfectly logical questions: At what cost? And for what pain?
Those questions are particularly acute when asked about hate
speech, speech that causes considerable pain and offers little in
the way of societal benefit. Yet our courts have fashioned a
strong defense of hate speech that is unique in the world. What is
it about United States constitutional history that has resulted in
such extensive protection being afforded to "hate" speech? Why
do the United States' courts act in a fashion so out of fashion-a
manner wholly at odds with the wisdom of the remainder of what
passes for the civilized world?' Do our judges simply fail to see
what is clear to everyone else?
II. PROTECTING FREE SPEECH
United States constitutional jurisprudence stands alone, to
be sure, for its treatment of a rather wide range of cases relating
to free speech. Without doubt, American jurists afford far greater
protection to free expression than exists anywhere else in the
world. Speech that other countries would deem libelous as to
public officials and public figures is protected in the United States
unless such speech is made with actual knowledge of falsity or
with serious doubt as to its truth or falsity.2 Protection is even
applied to false statements about "private" people if those state-
ments are made in a nonnegligent manner. 3 The United States
* Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel (New York).
1. See generally Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Nar-
ratives In Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 361-71 (1991) (discussing international
perspectives on hate speech); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2341-49 (1989) (reviewing
international legal responses to hate speech).
2. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing the
"actual malice" standard for alleged defamatory statements toward public
officials).
3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). In Gertz, the
Court held that "so long as [the States] do not impose liability without fault,
(743)
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Constitution protects speech that other countries would restrict
as revelations that actually-or "may" or "could"-threaten na-
tional security. 4 The Constitution also protects comments about
pending legal cases which is speech that other countries would
consider inappropriate and contemptuous. 5
In all of these areas and more, the United States affords more
legal protection to freedom of expression than is even conceiva-
ble in most (and probably all) other democratic countries. We
might argue at length about whether United States constitutional
history has struck the best balance between freedom and order;
we should not argue about the actual balance this history has
struck.
A. Hate Speech and the Constitution
In United States constitutional history, the area of hate
speech has been distinguishable from other areas of expression in
terms of its policy considerations and the resulting legal treat-
ment. To understand the legal protection of hate speech, one
must consider the policies in which constitutional interpretation
is rooted. The law affords broad protection in areas such as li-
[they] may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
Id. The Court also held "that the States may not permit recovery of presumed
or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349.
4. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). In
refusing to enjoin publication of a classified study regarding United States policy
in Vietnam, the New York Times Court adopted the presumption that any system
of prior restraint on expression is unconstitutional. Id. This presumption was
adopted despite the strong evidence that the publication would reveal poten-
tially damaging information. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
5. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-75 (1964) (limiting state's
power to impose sanctions for criticizing conduct of state court judges to state-
ments made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard of truth); Pen-
nekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347-50 (1946) (stating public criticism of
judges' inclinations does not present clear and immediate danger to fairness of
judicial administration and therefore "the door[s] of public comment" remain
open); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941) (holding "inherent
tendency" and "reasonable tendency" of out-of-court publication to cause disre-
spect for judiciary or to interfere with administration ofjustice during litigation
is not enough to justify restriction of free expression).
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bel, 6 prior restraints on reporting, 7 and constructive contempt 8
because of the judicial conclusion that only by providing protec-
tion to all forms of valuable speech-whether a minority or ma-
jority position-can the public be assured of the "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open debate" that was promised in New York
Times v. Sullivan.9 This argument is rarely made about hate
6. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-48 (protecting freedom of speech so long as
speaker's conduct or statements do not rise to level of negligence); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 279-80 (providing broader protection than Gertz to statements made
about public officials and public figures; person challenging free speech has
heightened burden of proving that speaker made defamatory statement with ac-
tual malice, not simply negligence); see also, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984) (applying "actual malice" stan-
dard from New York Times v. Sullivan to protect publication of critical product
review in magazine).
7. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (adopting presumption of unconstitu-
tionality for review of any injunction imposing prior restraint on reporting func-
tion of newspaper); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931) (holding
unconstitutional Minnesota statute that allowed government to enjoin publica-
tion of certain types of articles based on content). The Near Court stated that
"[c]harges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance,
unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guar-
anty is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to
prevent publication." Near, 283 U.S. at 722-23.
8. See Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 331 (holding that newspaper editorials and
cartoons criticizing court actions are protected; Court applied "clear and pres-
ent danger" rule despite recognizing that this was difficult standard for challeng-
ers to overcome); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding
that trial judge may not punish news media through contempt powers for pub-
lishing information even though "strongly implicative" of criminal defendant).
For additional discussion of Pennekamp and other related cases, see supra note 5.
9. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. The Court noted the purpose and intent be-
hind advocating robust public debate:
Those who won our independence believed.., that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human
institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds re-
pression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason
as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occa-
sional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitu-
tion so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)); see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAw 183-248 (1991) (discussing
high level of protection afforded to speech by "reckless disregard" standard ar-
ticulated in New York Times v. Sullivan); see also, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 ("Under
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."); Abrams v. United
3
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speech. l0 Those commentators, including myself, who favor the
relative tolerance with which the current law treats hate speech,
do not seek to defend this body of law by maintaining that with-
out the totality of hate speech the public would sustain some
grievous loss." On the contrary, hate speech is typically de-
fended as the price society has determined it must pay in order to
assure a system of free expression.' 2
Notwithstanding the sense of uneasiness that afflicts defend-
ers of those that engage in hate speech in the United States, such
speech has received a significant amount of legal protection. The
best known cases may well be the Skokie cases, which affirmed the
right of Nazis to march on a public street in a community popu-
lated with World War II concentration camp survivors.' 3 In Bran-
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market").
10. But cf. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 94-99,
132-35 (1981). Haiman is one commentator who offers explanations regarding
the potential importance of "low value" speech such as group libel and "fighting
words" to the public discourse. Haiman recognizes that group libel "serves no
useful function in the search for truth that is the purpose of a free marketplace
of ideas." Id. at 94. He argues, however, that if group defamation is banned
from the public arena, it will merely "go underground" where the defamatory
views will intensify. Id. at 98. Haiman opines that "frequent reexamination of
our own beliefs and values, in the face of the most extreme . . . challenges,"
brings these beliefs to the surface where public debate may possibly sway them.
Id. at 98-99.
Haiman also argues against the underlying rationale of the "fighting words"
doctrine. Id. at 132-134. His argument begins with the premise that courts be-
lieve the ideational content of certain types of epithets and personal abuse are so
minimal that legal restraint is permissible. Id. at 132-33. Haiman states: "How
it can seriously be argued that calling a policeman a 'Fascist,' or school board
members 'mother-fuckers,' is without ideational content escapes me com-
pletely.... Indeed I would suggest that it is precisely the ideational content that
makes the listener so angry." Id. at 133.
11. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, A First Amendment Overview, 55 BROOK L. REV.
71-73 (1989) (suggesting that free speech seeks to protect- self-expression and
dignity; free flow of information helps create a democratic culture); Nicholas
Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1991)
(arguing that protecting free speech eliminates need to perform impossible task
of distinguishing between varying degrees of truth and consequently stifles ex-
panding censorship).
c 12. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Good Speech Bad Speech: Should Universities Re-
sirict Expression That Is Racist Or Otherwise Denigrating? Two Views, 24 STAN. LAw. 4,
7 (1990). Gunther states that "[t]he refusal to suppress offensive speech is one
of the most difficult obligations the free speech principle imposes upon all of us;
yet it is one of the First Amendment's greatest glories-indeed it is a central test
of a community's commitment to free speech." Id. at 9.
13. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, and
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). In Collin, the court held that an ordinance that
prohibited a demonstration by the National Socialist Party was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. Id. at 1207. The court stated that "[t]he result we
746
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denburg v. Ohio, a landmark case decided by the Supreme Court in
1969, the right of the Ku Klux Klan to publicly call for the expul-
sion of African Americans and Jews from the United States, and
the right to suggest the desirability of violence (in veiled but un-
mistakable terms) were upheld, unless the speech was intended to
cause violence and had a high likelihood of producing such a re-
sult imminently. 14 The words used by the Klansmen in Branden-
burg are instructive: they said that "it's possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken";' 5 that the "nigger should
be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel";' 6 that we
should "[b]ury the niggers";17 and other equally vulgar state-
ments. Despite the Klansmen's use of racist and hate-filled lan-
guage, the Brandenburg Court adopted a legal test that must be
met before such speech can be punished. The Court provided:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. 18
This test is nearly impossible to meet.
While cases such as these set some of the parameters for un-
derstanding the legal treatment of hate speech under the Consti-
tution, as a whole it is an incomplete body of law and a number of
critical issues remain open. These open issues include: (a) the
continued viability of the so-called "fighting words" exception to
the First Amendment (and the precise definition of just what sort
of words are inevitably "fighting words"); 19 (b) the continued vi-
have reached is dictated by the fundamental proposition that if these civil rights
are to remain vital for all, they must protect not only those society deems accept-
able, but also those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects and despises." Id. at
1210.
14. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Brandenburg Court
considered the constitutionality of the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute. Id. at
444-45. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because it punished the
mere advocacy of an action and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 449.
15. Id. at 446.
16. Id. at 447.
17. Id. at 446 n. 1.
18. Id. at 447.
19. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining
"fighting words" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace"); Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as
Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 534 (1980) ("In the almost forty years since
1992]
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ability of any group libel law, given the Supreme Court's gener-
ally negative views on such laws as in New York Times v. Sullivan;20
and (c) the constitutionality of campus restrictions on racist
speech other than those involving direct threats, personal harass-
ment or the like.21
Although these issues are significant and currently disputed,
they should not divert attention from the remarkable degree of
judicial support for a body of law which generally tolerates even
the most vile hate speech.22 This support has recently been
strengthened by the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v. City of
St. Paul.23 R.A. V involved the prosecution of several teenagers
Chaplinsky was decided, the Court has not upheld a single conviction for the use
of fighting words"; and " 'the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is
merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky and that, in fact, the fighting words doc-
trine is moribund .... (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting))); cf. Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties:
The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 81, 101-05
(1991) (noting disagreement between two approaches to "fighting words" doc-
trine: the civil-liberties approach (marketplace of ideas) and the civil-rights ap-
proach (society of equal groups)).
20. For a discussion of New York Times v. Sullivan, see supra notes 2 & 9 and
accompanying text. See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952)
(upholding constitutionality of criminal group libel statute which prohibited dis-
semination of racist material; Court expressed no approval of legislation's wis-
dom or efficacy); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-17,
at 926-27 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court's decreased receptive-
ness to claims of group libel after Beauharnais); cf Note, A Communitarian Defense
of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 694-96 (1988) (suggesting New York
Times v. Sullivan did not restore First Amendment protection to all forms of
libelous speech and that Beauharnais and group libel laws are still alive).
21. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (enjoining enforcement of university anti-
harassment policy because it was unconstitutionally vague; interpreting "fight-
ing words" as only one area of speech that can be regulated); Doe v. University
of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding university hate
speech and harassment policy unconstitutional because it was overbroad and
vague; stating speech can be limited if it falls within category of "fighting words"
(Chaplinsky), speech inciting imminent lawless action (Brandenburg) and speech
that is vulgar, offensive and shocking (Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986))); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regu-
lating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-48 (1990) (discussing
tension between free speech and equality and arguing that regulation of racist
speech is necessary in order to battle racism; citing Brown v. Board of Education as
precedent supporting campus hate speech regulations); Nadine Strossen, Regu-
lating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 495-520
(1990) (discussing limited forms of campus hate speech that may be regulations
supported by current First Amendment precedent).
22. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 151-
69 (1992) (supporting First Amendment laws by stating that reason and toler-
ance must triumph over prejudice and hate through education, but efforts to
achieve such tolerance should not preempt the "market place of ideas").
23. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
748 [Vol. 37: p. 743
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for burning a cross on an African American family's lawn.24
In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, the defendants were prosecuted
under a city ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated conduct.25
The Court held that the ordinance was facially invalid under the
First Amendment because the ordinance only applied to behavior
or speech that fell within one of the articulated disfavored top-
ics. 26 Treating such selective limitations as content-based dis-
crimination, the Court invalidated St. Paul's hate speech
ordinance. 27
III. HISTORY'S HARD LESSONS AND THE FIVE FACTORS THAT
DRIVE THE TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Although there are numerous reasons for the high level of
judicial consensus regarding the treatment of hate speech, there
are five repeatedly expressed factors, or concerns, which I believe
are at the heart of past interpretations and will continue to be at
the heart of future interpretations. These five recurring factors
are: (a) doctrine, (b) precedent, (c) prudence, (d) American polit-
ical culture and (e) the high risk of suppressing any speech.
A. Doctrine
The first concern, and probably the most important basis un-
derlying our First Amendment interpretation, is doctrinal. No
principle has been articulated more consistently in First Amend-
ment law than the doctrine that legislation affecting speech may
not be based on disapproval of its content.28 This principle,
24. Id. at 2541.
25. Id. The relevant portion of St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance
stated:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appella-
tion, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
26. Id. at 2547.
27. Id. at 2550.
28. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988)
(holding First Amendment prohibits suppression of speech merely because of
offensive content); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1980) (finding Illinois
anti-picketing statute unconstitutional because it restricted expressive activity
based solely on message's nature and content); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (noting that "the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
1992] 749
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which was recently reasserted in two Supreme Court opinions
striking down statutes that banned flag burning, is at the heart of
constitutional law.2 9 Even more recently, this well founded prin-
ciple was the basis for holding New York's "Son of Sam" law un-
constitutional. 30 As summarized by Professor Laurence Tribe:
"If the Constitution forces government to allow people to march,
speak, and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and justice, then
it must also require government to allow them to advocate ha-
tred, racism, and genocide." 31 Thus, the generally accepted view
of the matter is clear-legislation may not prohibit speech simply
because its content is vulgar or offensive.32
B. Precedent
The second concern which tempers the temptation to accept
hate speech regulation concerns the precedential impact of such
limitations. If racist speech may be banned because it inflicts
psychic pain, what other currently controversial speech would be
denied protection? How would we treat speeches by David Duke
or Pat Buchanan that many have viewed as being racist? What
of speech that is said to be denigrating to women or
homophobic?3 3 What of movies such as "The Last Temptation of
its subject matter, or its content"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26
(1971) (noting that offensive expression must be tolerated because suppression
of speech risks suppression of ideas and such censorship may be used by govern-
ments to ban unpopular views).
29. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (holding
statute prohibiting flag burning unconstitutional because basic principle under-
lying First Amendment is that it protects expression society finds offensive);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (reversing conviction for flag dese-
cration; stating that function of free expression is to invite dispute and may best
serve its purpose when unrest, dissatisfaction or anger is induced).
30. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509
(1991). Simon & Schuster involved the review of New York's "Son of Sam" statute
which required an accused or convicted criminal to deposit income from artistic
works describing his or her crime into an account to be made available to victims
of the crime and creditors. Id. at 505-06. The law also provided that any entity
contracting with a criminal for production of a book, movie or other type of
work depicting the crime must pay the Crime Victims Board any money that the
entity owed to the criminal. Id. The Court found that this law violated the First
Amendment because it established a financial disincentive to create or publish a
work based on the work's specific content. Id. at 509.
31. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 838 n.17.
32. For a discussion of the doctrine against content-based legislation, see
supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
33. In the case of speech that is denigrating to women, the question is
hardly academic. The proposed Pornography Victims Compensation Act, cur-
rently before the SenateJudiciary Committee, would grant victims of violent sex
crimes the right to sue a producer of pornography if the victim can prove her
750
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Christ" or books such as Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses,"
which offended Christian and Islamic religious believers,
respectively? 34
In this area, the much discussed "slippery slope" is real. 35 It
should come as no surprise, in this respect, that so much of the
most enduring case law established under the First Amendment
has arisen in cases concerning racist speech. When confronted
with even the lowest forms of speech, the courts have consistently
reiterated the need to be aware of the potential negative conse-
quences to all forms of speech posed by creating limited excep-
tions. If longstanding doctrines are upset by attempts to ban
racist speech, the enduring principles that define our general First
Amendment protections would be compromised and, along with
them, many forms of desirable speech. If Near v. Minnesota should
fall because the speech in that case was anti-Semitic, and there-
fore judged not worthy of protection, the important precedent es-
tablished by Near (which bars virtually all governmental attempts
at prior restraints) would be placed, once again, at issue.3 6 Simi-
larly, if Brandenburg v. Ohio should fall, the Supreme Court once
again would have to review the core issue of when speech refer-
ring to and perhaps advocating illegal conduct may be banned. 37
These rulings are at the very core of First Amendment law. Re-
consideration of these holdings for the sole purpose of develop-
ing a "new" approach38 to permit the banning of hate speech
attacker was incited by the defendant's product. Legislative Proposals for Compensa-
tion of Victims of Sexual Crimes: Hearings on S. 1521 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 471 (1991) (statement of Senator Strom Thur-
mond, South Carolina).
34. See Floyd Abrams, A Worthy Tradition: The Scholar and the First Amendment,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1162, 1172 (1990) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)).
35. "Slippery slope" refers to the belief that once you start down the path
of regulation, inevitability the initial precedent will be used to expand the scope
of regulated subject matters. The inability to draw distinguishable lines between
protected matters and unprotected matters will inhibit the courts' ability to stop
the expanding regulation. See Wolfson, supra note 11, at 10. For example, in the
freedom of speech context some believe that the precedent set by an attempt to
suppress wholly undesirable speech, such as hate speech, may eventually be
used to suppress desirable speech.
36. See Abrams, supra note 34, at 1172. For a discussion of Near v. Minne-
sota, see supra note 7.
37. See Abrams, supra note 34, at 1172. For a discussion of Brandenburg, see
supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narra-
tives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 376-87 (1991) (highlighting inadequacies
of conventional First Amendment analysis in dealing with hate speech issues);
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2374-80 (1989) (concluding that narrow interpretation of
19921
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would threaten critical Supreme Court rulings at the very time in
which those rulings need continued support, given the changing
personae on the Court.
Freedom of speech has never been considered an absolute.
Every major new doctrinal exception to the general rule that
speech may not be infringed leads in turn to new demands for
further exceptions.3 9 What else would one expect? As Duke Law
Professor Walter Dellinger observed in opposing a constitutional
amendment which would overrule the flag-burning cases:
What would this proposed act of constitutional revision
do to the moral legitimacy of the stance our Constitution
has taken (and will continue to take) in defense of ex-
pression that offends many Americans as deeply as flag-
burning offends the great majority of us? . . . Once we
have quickly passed the . . . Amendment to protect the
sensibilities of those who revere the flag, what do we say
to those who are particularly offended by, but must con-
tinue to tolerate, the burning of crosses by hooded mem-
bers of the Ku Klux Klan . . . ? And what do we say to
those who find themselves silenced and marginalized by
sexualized (but not constitutionally "obscene") portray-
als of women? What enduring constitutional principle
will remain unimpaired that will legitimately surmount
these claims . . . ?40
Despite constant repetition of the "slippery slope" concept,
or whatever metaphor one chooses to apply, the fact remains that
the free speech doctrine is not easily conducive to amendment.
Although strong arguments can be made regarding the restriction
on certain categories of speech, the courts have repeatedly
shown-and rightfully so-that free speech must be viewed as an
integrated whole, not as a conglomeration of components. Thus,
when one argues to limit one component of speech, or one appli-
First Amendment in response to hate speech perpetuates racism; calling for doc-
trinal change from private to public sanctions).
39. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 314-15 (1991) (arguing that past balancing tests have
resulted in overbroad restrictions on speech, and noting that "in the American
context, the temptation to balance rests on what might be termed the fallacy of
immaculate isolation").
40. Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v.
Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (statement of Prof. Walter
Dellinger, Duke University Law School).
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cation, the courts cannot disregard the delicate balance between
the targeted speech and all other forms of speech.
C. Prudence
Prudence is the third factor that prevents limitation on hate
speech and protects free speech in general. The dictates of pru-
dence rest on the historically proven reality that limitations on
speech-even on racist speech-have predominantly been used to
suppress speech of minorities rather than to protect those minori-
ties. In England, for example, the Race Relations Act of 1965 has
led to repeated prosecutions of black leaders, whose rhetoric has
tended thus far to be more inflamed than that of white bigots.41
On at least one American campus the same has been the case: at
the University of Michigan, whose rule banning hate speech was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, 42 white students filed
more than twenty complaints accusing African American students
of racist speech.43
The experience of Jews has been similar. Nadine Strossen
has, for example, recalled that none of the anti-Semites who were
responsible for arousing France against Captain Alfred Dreyfus
were ever prosecuted for group libel.44 Emile Zola, however, was
prosecuted for libel after writing J'Accuse (which depicted the
French clergy and military poorly) and was forced to flee France
as a result.45 When rules-aimed at the neo-Nazi National
Front-were imposed on British campuses and applied to repre-
sentatives of "openly racist and fascist organizations" in an
attempt to encourage students to silence their speakers "by
whatever means necessary," who was silenced? It was, of course,
the Israeli ambassador to England and other Israeli and Zionist
speakers. 46 More recently, Aryeh Neier, defending the ACLU's
41. Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great Britain-Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 166, 169, 171-73 (1987) (discussing past use of
England's Race Relations Act of 1965 to prosecute black speakers at Black
Power gatherings and in other similar contexts).
42. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856, 867 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (University of Michigan adopted policy in attempt to curb rise of racial
intolerance and racially motivated harassment on campus; regulation was held
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). For a discussion of the holding in Doe,
see supra note 21.
43. Strossen, supra note 21, at 557.
44. Id. at 556.
45. Id.
46. Id. Strossen notes: "In perhaps the ultimate irony, [the British Race
Relations Act of 1965], which was intended to restrain the neo-Nazi National
Front, instead has barred expression by the Anti-Nazi League." Id.
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(and his own) defense of the Nazis in the Skokie cases, observed
that:
It is a matter of self-interest. The oppressed are the vic-
tims of power. If they are to end their oppression, they
must either win [their] freedom or take power
themselves.
... Jews and friends ofJews may hold power in Sko-
kie, but they do not hold power in the rest of the coun-
try. Nor will they ever. The Jews in Skokie require
restraints on power to guard themselves. Keeping a few
Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it
means that the freedoms to speak, publish, or assemble
any place in the United States are thereby weakened.
... It is dangerous to let the Nazis have their say.
But it is more dangerous by far to destroy the laws that
deny anyone the power to silence Jews if Jews should
need to cry out to each other and to the world for
succor.
4 7
D. American Political Culture
A fourth consideration which has allowed for broad free
speech protection is rooted in the exceptional nature of American
political culture. Unlike other nations, the United States has re-
mained relatively unthreatened by the baleful social conflicts that
have buffeted other nations to the point that hate speech regula-
tions had been deemed necessary. Even though slavery was prev-
alent during the drafting of our Constitution (and was, to some
extent, explicitly incorporated in the Constitution), the United
States has never been so near explosion as a result of speech that
broad speech regulations have ever been deemed necessary.
There are no current risks of the communal violence that has
plagued India (and has led to significant restrictions on speech);
no history, fortunately, such as that of Germany (which has led to
laws making it a crime to deny the reality of what occurred at Au-
schwitz48 ) or the like. Whatever sense of self-assurance an Ameri-
47. ARVEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE
CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 5-7 (1979).
48. See Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"--And Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986). The Federal Re-
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can speaks with about his or her own nation-before and after the
Los Angeles riots-simply may not be applicable to foreign na-
tions with very different traditions and histories. Except, that is,
that restrictions on speech should be a last resort everywhere.
E. Risk
The fifth factor affecting free speech protection, and by far
the most problematic, is that even racist speech may nonetheless
contain views or information that we ban only at our peril. Take
for example, as noted above, two prior candidates for the presi-
dency of the United States who repeatedly expressed in the past
what some considered as racist and anti-Semitic views. Would we
ever consider a ban on expression of such views? In fact, has our
society not benefitted from knowing that these individuals sub-
scribed to such views? More broadly, views about distinct groups
which are potentially racist in nature may well be the basis for
public policy positions in the future. If some psychologists per-
ceive African Americans as genetically inferior, that may well af-
fect the view of those people about how to deal with poverty in
the United States. As offensive and outrageous as those views
are, can they really be banned without impoverishing the scope of
public debate?49 It is often the radical and potentially offensive
viewpoints that act as important catalysts for public discussion of
difficult and oft-avoided issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
The previously discussed factors hardly exhaust the list uti-
lized by those people who have chosen to protect free speech and
not to ban hate speech. But these factors have a single theme in
common: the risks inherent in suppressing speech-even racist
speech-tend to outweigh whatever gains may be thought to flow
from the suppression of those views. Constitutional law is filled
public of Germany reformed its Criminal Code in 1985 to prosecute against
propaganda known as the "Auschwitz lie"-the claim that the extermination of
the Jews by the National Socialist regime never took place. Id. at 280.
49. Recall, for example, the anger with which (now Senator) Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's report on the black family was met when it was first published in
1965. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (analyzing the difficult
challenges faced by the average black family in America); see also LEE RAINWA-
TER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CON-
TROVERSY (1967). Moynihan's analysis became the basis for significant public
debate, some of which has been acerbic in nature, but serious in content. See,
e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1980).
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with expressions of concern about good faith efforts to avoid
harm by banning speech. "Men feared witches and burnt wo-
men," wrote Justice Brandeis; 50 "[i]t is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears." 5' On one level,
Justice Holmes observed, "[e]very idea is an incitement" to ac-
tion. 52 But to protect speech that one thinks is immoral or even
dangerous does not "indicate that you think the speech impo-
tent."5 3 As Holmes summarized, "we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so immi-
nently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and press-
ing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country."'54
Fortunately-most fortunately-that day has never arisen in
the United States. Nor, I suggest, has it arisen often enough
outside the United States to justify the ease and the frequency
with which freedom of expression has so commonly been
overcome.
I know that the temptation to ban speech that we think-and
think we know-is "bad" is sometimes overwhelming. Speech
matters; it can do harm; it sometimes has done harm. But our
approach under the Constitution, at its very best, has generally
been to risk the harm that speech may inflict to avoid the greater
harm that the suppression of speech has so often caused.
50. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that fear of injury cannot justify suppression of speech regard-
less of good intentions).
51. Id. (stating that free speech cannot be suppressed unless there is rea-
sonable fear that serious injury is imminent).
52. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes believed that every idea offers itself for belief and will be acted
upon unless its energy is stifled or another belief outweighs it. Id. He stated
that "[t]he only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incite-
ment ... is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result." Id.
53. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id.
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